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Climate change will have many impacts on our everyday lives, but this 
paper focuses on a single subset—how both property law and coastal
landowners will be forced to adjust to the ocean’s movement inland. This 
paper explores whether “rolling easements”—a legal instrument often 
associated with the landmark Texas case of Severance v. Patterson1—may
be implemented in California to ensure public access to beach lands following 
coastal migration onto private property.
California’s coastline is nearly 850 miles long, and when the undulations
of tidal and marshland areas are included that number nearly quadruples
to over 3400 miles.2 Although much of this coastline is undeveloped and 
preserved as parkland or open space, the value of the view itself and of 
access to the open water has led to considerable private development of 
land along the beach.3 This raises a fundamental policy question for any 
coastal state:
As communities have discovered the values of attractive waterfront areas, conflicts
have arisen as to who will share in the benefits. Will waterfronts become a public asset, 
a hybrid of a grand promenade and linear park for access and recreational use, or
an asset to be privatized for exclusive profit and utilization?4 
Coastal lands are extremely valuable, but who owns them? Moreover, 
when the waterline moves, what impact does that have on ownership of
those lands? Finally, how do the effects of climate change on coastlines— 
both sea-level rise and more frequent and severe storm systems—impact
the rights of both public and private individuals to enjoy the benefits of 
beachfront property?
The Texas Supreme Court faced these questions in the case of Severance
v. Patterson.5 In Severance, the court assessed whether a sudden landward 
migration of the beach effected an in-kind migration of a public beach 
easement that would constitute a taking of petitioner’s property in violation 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.6 Texas 
state law, under the Texas Open Beaches Act (TOBA), has long provided 
for an easement that moves with the water in order to preserve the public’s
 1. Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 712 (Tex. 2012). 
2. List of U.S. States by Coastline, WIKIPEDIA (citing data from the Congressional 
Research Service), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_U.S._states_by_coastline [https://perma. 
cc/7GPU-8LET] (last updated Jan. 28, 2017). 
3. See George R. Parsons & Michael Powell, Measuring the Cost of Beach Retreat, 29 
COASTAL MGMT. 91, 98 (2001). 
4. Timothy M. Mulvaney & Brian Weeks, Waterlocked: Public Access to New Jersey’s
Coastline, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 579, 581 (2007). 
5. Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 712 (Tex. 2012). 
6. Id. 
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right to beach access in the state.7 However, the Severance court held that
this type of rolling easement did not apply in the context of sudden 
changes to the coastline profile brought on by severe storm events (in that
case, Hurricane Rita of 2005).8 Although the court’s holding in Severance 
limited the application of rolling easements under Texas law, these easements
remain a potentially viable legal vehicle for preservation of public access
to coastal areas in other states, including California. 
As coastal development in California continues to increase, private property
rights must be balanced against the public’s right of access and use of these 
waterfront areas.9 In many areas of California the beach has both public 
and private owners. Coastal erosion and sea level rise will continue to create 
conflicts between these interests. Thus, California will likely be forced to
answer the same legal and public policy questions that the Texas courts faced 
in the Severance case.
This paper explores the viability of rolling easements in California as 
well as how they might be implemented. California has the opportunity to
use rolling easement doctrine to fill the public policy vacuum created by
the Severance decision. By ‘messing with Texas’ precedent, California could 
utilize rolling easements to preserve public access to its beaches in the wake 
of coastal inundation resulting from climate change. 
Determining whether and how rolling easements might be used in California 
requires an understanding of climate change as a man-made phenomenon 
and the impacts it has on coastal property. The next sections will outline 
this critical background, and are followed by a survey of relevant legal doctrines 
including takings jurisprudence, property law principles and the public 
trust. This legal context is essential to understanding the feasibility of the 
rolling easement concept in California. 
A. Climate Change
The earth has been steadily warming over the past thirty years as
increasing amounts of greenhouse gases (GHGs) are released into the
atmosphere. These gases act as a ceiling in the sky, trapping energy—and 
heat—inside. This process has a warming effect on everything under that 
7. Richard J. McLaughlin, Rolling Easements as a Response to Sea Level Rise in 
Coastal Texas: Current Status of the Law After Severance v. Patterson, 26 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 365, 370 (2011). 
8. Severance, 370 S.W.3d at 732. 
9. See id.
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‘lid,’ including the ocean, ice and glaciers, landmasses, and the air itself.
Although the release of GHGs and this resultant ‘greenhouse effect’ is a 
normal, even essential element of the maintenance of the earth’s biosphere
and ecosystems, in recent history the amount of GHGs released has significantly
increased. The scientific community is in near-total consensus that these
additional GHG emissions are primarily the result of artificial, human-
caused activities.10 
The inertia that characterizes climate change and its effects makes
attributing responsibility for the phenomenon difficult.11 Determining the
current rate of GHG emissions—a complicated endeavor when considering
all sources and incorporating life-cycle analysis—is a fundamentally different
calculation than that required to account for the cumulative level of emissions
and their ecological impact. As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) noted nearly fifteen years ago: 
Inertia is a widespread inherent characteristic of the interacting climate, ecological and
socio-economic systems. Thus, some impacts of anthropogenic climate change 
may be slow to become apparent, and some could be irreversible if climate change is
not limited in both rate and magnitude before associated thresholds, whose positions 
may be poorly known, are crossed.12 
As concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere increase a larger amount 
of the sun’s energy is trapped and the earth’s climate responds by getting 
warmer. However, this energy is not distributed equally among the world’s 
terrains. Nearly 90% of the excess energy/heat is stored in the oceans,
with most of the remainder leading to melted glaciers and ice caps and sea 
ice, and only a tiny fraction—around 1%—warming the air/atmosphere.13 
As a result, humans are more likely to see the impacts of climate change 
through physical changes than they are to feel them through warmer
ambient temperatures.
B. Sea-Level Rise
As the oceans absorb increasing amounts of the sun’s energy and heat, 
and as global temperatures increase, water molecules expand and are
joined by a growing volume of melted land ice, leading to sea level rise.14
 10. Scientific consensus: Earth’s climate is warming, NASA, http://climate.nasa.gov/
scientific-consensus/ [https://perma.cc/8UHJ-LFD9] (last updated Feb. 26, 2017). 
11. See DANIEL L. ALBRITTON ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: SYNTHESIS REPORT
87–96 (Robert T. Watson et al. ed., 2001).
 12. Id. at 88.
13. Myles R. Allen et al., Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
SYNTHESIS REPORT 1, 4 (Rajendra K. Pachauri et al. ed., 2015). 
14. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT’L ACAD, SEA LEVEL RISE FOR THE COASTS
OF CALIFORNIA, OREGON, AND WASHINGTON: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 1, (2012). 
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Although sea level rise will not be uniform across regions (owing to
differences in coastal depths, receipt of melted glacial ice, and other factors), 
it is estimated that by the end of the twenty-first century more than 95% 
of ocean areas will rise, and that some 70% of the world’s coastlines will
experience sea level rise within 20% of the global mean.15 
Coastal lands are bound on at least one side by the ocean, meaning that
as sea level rise moves the water line inland, formerly dry land will be 
inundated. In low-lying coastal areas, the effect will be amplified, as inland 
inundation from even minor levels of sea level rise will be significant.16 
In particular, regions with extended continental shelves could see the high
tide line move 20 to 100 meters inland as a result of a single centimeter of 
sea level rise.17 In areas where private individuals own and have developed
the land up to the beach line, rising seas and public access rights are on a 
collision course with the private property rights of landowners. What was 
previously private property will be inundated by an ocean that is, by definition, 
‘public.’
C. Changes in Storm Frequency and Magnitude 
Climate change will lead to increased storm frequency and severity, 
though there is no consensus among climate models about whether this 
will occur along California’s coast.18 Storms can vary as a result of the
characteristics of the ocean in which they occur, and differences in ocean
basins can lead to different climate change-induced effects on storms.19 In 
particular, estimates reveal that the Atlantic Ocean will see more frequent
hurricanes, whereas the Pacific Ocean will see stronger storms.20 However, 
even if these predicted effects do not occur, the mere existence of sea-
level rise will increase the harm resulting from storm events along the
coast as their proximity to human structures and activities grows.21
 15. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 13, at 13. 
16. See Orrin H. Pilkey & J. Andrew G. Cooper, Society and Sea Level Rise, 303 
SCIENCE 1781 (2004).
17. Id. at 1782. 
18. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 14, at 6. 
19. Margaret E. Peloso & Margaret R. Caldwell, Dynamic Property Rights: The 
Public Trust Doctrine and Takings in a Changing Climate, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 53
n.5 (2011). 
20. Id.
 21. ALBRITTON ET AL., supra note 11, at 1, 8.
 229
GINNO (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/2017 11:06 AM     
 
 


























     
  
  
II. RELEVANT PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW
Assessing the potential utility of rolling easements in California requires 
exploration of fundamental property law concepts. Primary categories of
relevant property law include coastal-littoral property law doctrines, takings
law and precedent, the public trust doctrine, and state laws governing coastal 
land use. These legal doctrines will each have unique effects on the way
California courts might assess the impacts of sea level rise and increased
storm frequency and severity on legal title to coastal lands. 
A. Coastal/Littoral Property Law Doctrine 
Individual ownership of property is a fundamental part of American
jurisprudence. Ownership, use and enjoyment of land along the coast is 
governed by common law and constrained by other doctrines, including
the public trust, land use laws and constitutional takings precedent. 
Property that abuts water is known as riparian or ‘littoral,’ meaning
property “bordering on the shore; pertaining to the shore of the sea.”22 Unlike
non-littoral property, which has static and unmoving boundaries, any parcel 
bound by water may wander, growing or shrinking in size with the waterway’s
movement. This riparian dynamic led to the development of the property
law principles of ‘accretion’ and ‘avulsion,’ which dictate to whom title 
belongs depending on the characterization of the water’s movement in 
both spatial (geographic) and temporal (time) terms.23 
Henry Philip Farnham’s 1904 treatise The Law of Waters and Water Rights
thoroughly describes the doctrine of accretion, in explaining Severance v.
Patterson, as the “gradual and imperceptible addition to the shore of
sediment, so that the shore is extended into the water.”24 Farnham also 
outlines the opposite “very rare” condition of avulsion as one wherein “a 
large quantity of land is suddenly added to the shore by its severance bodily
from its former location.”25 The distinction between the two concepts is 
critical in determining who holds title after a shoreline change. If the shore 
moves “imperceptibly” the title can change with the water’s movement,
but if it moves suddenly, title stays with the original owner.26 
The treatise further explains that the doctrines of accretion and avulsion 
attempt to distinguish between a situation where “a sudden disruption of 
22. Littoral, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969). 
23. See Holly Doremus, Climate Change and the Evolution of Property Rights, 1 
UC IRVINE L. REV. 1091, 1109 (2011). 
24. HENRY PHILIP FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 320 (Lawyers’ 
Co-Operative Publishing Co. ed. 1904). 
25. Id.
26. Id. at 320-1. 
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a piece of ground from one man’s land to another’s, which may be followed 
and identified,” and the change resulting, either slowly or rapidly, from 
floods but which is “utterly beyond the power of identification.”27 These 
doctrines and their practical application will prove significant in analyzing 
the impact climate change and sea level rise will have on private ownership 
of coastal lands. 
Although the rules of accretion and avulsion make sense in the context
of water bodies whose movements have a relatively equal likelihood of
moving either way, they seem less applicable to the case of oceanfront
property facing the continual creep of the waterline in a single direction— 
inland.28 An examination of the historical circumstances surrounding the 
development of these doctrines reveals that it may be appropriate now to 
depart from them, based on their inapplicability to the facts that characterize
coastline movement due to sea level rise.29 
Professor Joseph Sax was a foremost theorist of water law, natural
resources law, and the public trust.30 Sax has specifically spoken to the
question of whether these English common law littoral land principles
should apply in the contemporary coastal context.31 He explains that the 
doctrines of accretion and avulsion developed when new land resulting 
from water’s movement was used for livestock grazing, thus the crown
“would suffer no harm from the land passing into private ownership.”32 
By contrast, beach submersion and migration resulting from sea level rise 
creates harm to the public through the loss of access to coastal lands. This
fundamental variation in circumstances may indicate a need to re-examine 
the rules governing littoral land boundaries. 
B. Takings Doctrine 
Another important principle of property law in coastal land use is the 
issue of unconstitutional takings. Takings law addresses whether a
governmental restriction or prohibition on private land use constitutes a 
27. Id. at 321 n.1. 
28. See J. Peter Byrne, Rising Seas and Common Law Baselines: A Comment on
Regulatory Takings Discourse Concerning Climate Change, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 625, 633 
(2010).
29. See id. at 635. 
30. See generally Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25
ECOLOGY L. Q. 351 (1998-1999) (citing Joseph Sax’s works and theories contained therein). 
31. See Byrne, supra note 28, at 633. 
32. Id.
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taking of private property without just compensation in violation of the 
Fifth33 and Fourteenth Amendments34 to the U.S. Constitution. Takings
claims often arise when government entities act to preserve public access 
to lands in coastal areas.
Government actions can yield takings claims in two ways. One is by the 
actual physical occupation of property, such as through eminent domain,
and always requires just compensation.35 The second is a ‘regulatory taking’, 
those regulatory impositions that are “so onerous that [their] effect is
tantamount to . . . ouster.”36 There are two types of regulatory enactments: 
‘per se takings,’ which eliminate all economic use of the land, and all other 
regulatory takings.37 
Significant jurisprudence has developed surrounding the question of
when a regulatory taking requires compensation. In Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council the Court held that per se takings required compensation38 
unless the regulation at issue essentially codifies a limit on the property’s 
use that already existed under common law.39 Lucas dealt with the impact
of legislation—South Carolina’s Beachfront Management Act—on a private
landowner whose property use was limited by the Act.40 Justice Scalia’s
majority opinion explains that for regulations prohibiting all economically
beneficial use of land (per se takings), “[a]ny limitation so severe cannot 
be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere 
in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State’s 
law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.”41 
The “background principles” that Justice Scalia refers to in Lucas are 
the common law doctrines of property, contract, and tort.42 Lucas holds
that these background principles can form the basis of a defense against a
takings claim, and as a result the environmental community is increasingly 
using this approach as a “shield” in takings cases.43 The Court in Lucas 
accorded judicial primacy to these “background principles”—or common 
law rights—of private property holders when weighing them against the 
33. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
 34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
35.  Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 19, at 62. 
36. Id. (citing to Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005)). 
37. See Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 19, at 62 (discussing recent Supreme Court 
decisions on regulatory takings). 
38. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). 
39. See id. at 1029–30. 
40. See id. at 1008.
 41. Id. at 1029. 
42. James. L. Huffman, Background Principles and the Rule of Law: Fifteen Years 
after Lucas, 35 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1, 2 (2008). 
43. Id.
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public’s rights when it measured the constitutional authority of legislatures to
enact such restrictions.44 
If a taking is not a ‘per se’ taking, courts evaluate the governmental 
action in question using the rules outlined in Penn Central Transportation 
Company v. New York City.45 The Penn Central analysis requires the
courts to weigh a number of factors—the economic impact of the regulation,
the character of the governmental action, and the property owner’s reasonable 
investment backed expectations—to determine if an unconstitutional taking
occurred.46 Notably, the burden of proof in the Penn Central test is on the
private property landowner.47 
The Supreme Court has validated property use restrictions proffered by
courts.48 In Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department of
Environmental Protection, the Court upheld a Florida state beach restoration 
program that fixed the boundary line between state and private waterfront 
beach property then added sand onto the state’s submerged lands to preserve 
the selected boundary.49 The petitioners in that case argued that they had 
a right to property gains through accretion, and their right had been denied 
when the state court approved the validity of the beach program.50 Interestingly, 
although the court did not hold that the beach renourishment program 
constituted a judicial taking, Justice Scalia’s opinion for four of the justices
ruled that state courts are subject to the same takings prohibition as are 
legislatures.51 This was not an issue in the Beach Renourishment case
though, as the Court held that the petitioners did not have a superior property
right to claim under Florida law that was being taken in the first place,
saying their “. . .right to accretions was. . .subordinate to the State’s right
to fill.”52 
Another important area of takings precedent is the rule regarding
development permit requirements laid out in Nollan v. California Coastal
 44. See id.
45.  438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
46.  Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 19, at 63. 
47. Justin R. Pidot, Fees, Expenditures, and the Takings Clause, 41 ECOLOGY L. Q.
131, 134 (2014). 
48. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592
(2010).
49. Id. at 2612. 
50. Id. at 2610–11.
 51. Doremus, supra note 23, at 120–21. 
52. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. at 2595.
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Commission53 and Dolan v. City of Tigard54 The holdings of the two cases
are often referred to in combination as the “Nollan/Dolan test.” This test 
requires that when the government places conditions on the issuance of
permits, it must prove that the conditions (1) bear an essential nexus to 
(Nollan) and (2) rough proportionality with (Dolan) the effects of the 
activities subject to permitting.55 If the government does not make a
sufficient showing of both elements, a taking has occurred. 
One theory holds that if California had argued that the easement it required 
of the Nollans was based on the public trust doctrine and the need for 
access to the ocean, it might have avoided being a taking under the Penn. 
Central test.56 However, given the Nollan court’s novel focus on the 
practice of ‘exactions,’ it seems unlikely that the Court would have ruled
that no taking had occurred, even if the state had made public trust arguments.57 
As sea levels continue to rise and inundate greater portions of 
California’s coastline, the water’s edge will run up to—and eventually
over—significant swaths of private property. Previously accessible public 
beaches will also move upland with the rising water and into areas under 
private ownership. Any attempt to preserve the public’s access to these 
lands will surely be met with takings claims and will require a solid legal
footing to withstand them.
C. California Takings Law & Jurisprudence 
The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reserves to the states
those powers not explicitly granted to them in the document, including the 
police power.58 Police powers are the states’ authority to act to protect 
public health, safety and welfare, and are deemed to include the power of
land use regulation.59 In California, the state constitution delegates significant
land use control to local governments,60 which work with the various entities
listed above in subsection B to regulate land use through their permitting 
authority. This is a critical function for both state and local governments. 
53.  483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
54.  512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
55. Pidot, supra note 47, at 134. 
56.  Mulvaney & Weeks, supra note 4, at 596, 596 n.67 (citing Sean T. Morris). 
57. See Alan Romero, Two Constitutional Theories for Invalidating Extortionate 
Exactions, 78 NEB. L. REV. 348, 349 (1999). 
58.  U.S. Const. amend. X. 
 59. Bill Higgins, Regulatory Takings and Land Use Regulation: A Primer for Public 
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Indeed, “[t]he State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which
the whole people are interested . . . than it can abdicate its police powers. . .”61 
Land use permitting decisions in the state are governed by the Nollan/ 
Dolan test outlined above, as well as other cases further refining the standards
and parsing out requirements and limitations regulating coastal land use.
The Penn Central factors are used to assess whether a taking has occurred 
once a court determines that some economic value still exists in the property 
(thus, not a ‘per se taking’ requiring compensation under Lucas). 
Coastal property owners’ use of their property is further limited by another
California court case, Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast
Regional Com.62 In Avco, a developer’s project construction timeline
overlapped with the passage and enactment of Proposition 20 of 1972, the 
ballot initiative that created the California Coastal Commission.63 The developer 
sought an exemption from the Act’s permitting requirements. In this
specific case, the grading work had not been complete, and completed grading 
was a county prerequisite for issuance of a building permit. Although the 
developer in Avco obtained a grading permit from the county, secured 
approval of a final tract map, commenced grading, installed subdivision 
improvements pursuant to county approvals, and spent over $2 million on
the project prior to the effective date of the Act, the court denied the 
exemption.64 
The Avco case established the rules for the vesting of coastal development 
rights. Under Avco, once a developer obtains an actual permit (as opposed
to other pre-permit construction or approvals), it has acquired a vested right
to complete construction in accordance with the terms of the permit.65 
Once the landowner has secured that vested right, the government may not,
by virtue of a change in zoning laws, prohibit construction authorized by
the permit on which he relied.66 Because the Avco case applied to changes 
61.  Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). 
62. Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc. v. S. Coast Reg’l Comm’n., 553 P.2d 546 (Cal. 
1976) (superseded by statute in part, see Cotta v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 612, 619 n.5 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding that “any change in the rule that a developer 
has no vested rights in existing zoning must come from the Legislature. Thereafter, the 
Legislature enacted a statute permitting local governments to freeze zoning early in the
development process, before building permits are issued.”)). 
63. Avco, 553 P.2d at 546–50. 
64. Id.
65. Santa Margarita Area Residents Together v. San Luis Obispo Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 
100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 745–46 (Ct. App. 2000). 
66. Avco, 553 P.2d 546. 
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in zoning laws by governments, it remains to be seen if the same rule would 
apply to bar the government’s denial of the ability to build on the coast 
pursuant to a rolling easement once a developer had been issued a permit 
and thus had a ‘vested right’ to complete construction.
California statute provides another interesting distinction regarding
ownership of littoral land changes resulting from accretion, stating that
only those arising from “natural causes” accrue to the littoral landowner.67 
Although this code section is limited to land adjacent to rivers and streams, it
provides insight into the Legislature’s conception of property rights in the 
state.68 
D. Public Trust Doctrine 
One critical background principle of California state property law is the 
Public Trust Doctrine. A part of the common law, the Public Trust Doctrine
emanates from ancient Roman law and holds that certain lands, including
the sea, are public property held in common in perpetuity. The doctrine 
states:
By the law of nature these things are common to mankind—the air, running water,
the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea. No one, therefore, is forbidden to 
approach the seashore, provided that he respects habitations, monuments, and the 
buildings, which are not, like the sea, subject only to the law of nations.69 
In California the public trust has been held to bar private ownership of 
the strip of land between the mean low and mean high tide marks,70 which 
is determined by averaging the high and low tide levels over 18.6 years.71 
This area is sometimes called the “foreshore” or “wet sand beach.”72 
Conversely, in most states, development has been allowed in the region 
between the mean high tide line and the vegetation line, sometimes referred 
to as the “dry sand beach.”73
 67. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1014 (2016) (West, WestlawNext through 2016 Reg.Sess. 
laws, Ch. 8 of 2015-2016 2nd Ex.Sess.). 
68. Id. 
69. Mulvaney & Weeks, supra note 4, at 582 (citing to INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 90 
(Thomas Collett Sandars trans., Longmans, Green & Co. ed. 1905)).
70. Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 19, at 57 (citing to Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 
1 (1894); see also Mulvaney & Weeks, supra note 4, at 582–83 (referring to public trust 
doctrine since English common law after signing of the Magna Charta prohibiting private
ownership of beach lands). 
71. Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 19, at 57 (citing to Borax Consol. Ltd. v. Los
Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 26–27 (1935)). 
72. COASTAL STATES ORG., PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK xiv–xv
(David Slade ed., 2d ed. 1997). 
73. Id. at xiv. In some states, such as Oregon, the dry beach is public. Stevens v.
City of Cannon Beach, 835 P.2d 940, 941 (Or. 1992). 
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The public trust doctrine was first cited in the 1892 case of Illinois Central 
Railway v. Illinois.74 In Illinois, the Supreme Court held that title through 
the public trust may not be given away and that states must preserve the
public trust.75 Outlining the government’s role as a trustee on behalf of the
public, the Court in Illinois stated:
The state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people 
are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so as to leave them
entirely under the use and control of private parties, except in the instance of 
parcels mentioned for the improvement of the navigation and use of the waters, 
or when parcels can be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in
what remains, than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government 
and the preservation of the peace. In the administration of government, the use of
such powers may for a limited period be delegated to a municipality or other body,
but there always remains with the state the right to revoke those powers and exercise
them in a more direct manner, and one more conformable to its wishes. So with
trusts connected with public property, or property of a special character, like lands
under navigable waters; they cannot be placed entirely beyond the direction and
control of the state.76 
The public trust, also recognized in California law,77 holds that beach 
land below the high tide mark is held in the public trust and must be 
publicly accessible.78 Property inland of the mean high tide mark may be
privately held, but provisions of state and federal law that control land and
water use and development to ensure that the public trust is adequately 
maintained limit the owner’s use of their land. 
E. Coastal Land Use and Ownership in California 
Federal, state, and local government entities are involved in the control
and regulation of coastal development in California. Jurisdiction over
coastal land use is governed by a number of statutes, including: The 
California Coastal Act of 1976,79 the federal Coastal Zone Management
74. S.F. Baykeeper, Inc. v. Cal. State Lands Comm’n, 194 Cal. Rptr. 3d 880, 904–05 
(Ct. App. 2015). 
75. Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 19, at 58 (citing to Ill. Cent. R.R.. v. Illinois, 146 
U.S. 387, 452–53 (1892)). 
76. Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453–54. 
77. See generally Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
78.  Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 19, at 109 (Appendix A). 
79. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30000 (West, WestlawNext through 2016 Reg. Sess. 
laws, Ch. 8 of 2015-2016 2nd Ex.Sess.). 
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Act (“CZMA”),80 the McAteer-Petris Act,81 and the Suisun Marsh Preservation
Act.82 Coastal land use is also regulated by the California Coastal Commission, 
San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission (“SFBCDC”), 
the California Coastal Conservancy, and cities and counties along the coast.83 
Under the authority of these entities and statutory directives, the state of 
California has developed a federally-approved Coastal Management Program,
which holds that the Coastal Commission and SFBCDC manage coastal
development, whereas the Coastal Conservancy purchases and protects coastal
84resources.
These entities’ decisions restricting or prohibiting building and construction 
or other uses of private property along the beach are often contested as 
unconstitutional takings of private property without just compensation in
violation of the Fifth85 and Fourteenth Amendments86 to the U.S. Constitution. 
As a result, any assessment of the legal options available in California to 
preserve public access to beach lands in the event of tidal migrations inland 
must consider the courts’ takings jurisprudence. 
III. ARE ‘ROLLING EASEMENTS’ THE ANSWER? 
Rolling easements are one possible approach to adapt to rising sea levels.87 
According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) Sea Level
Rise Project Manager James G. Titus, “there are two primary responses to 
sea level rise: holding back the sea or allowing the shore to retreat.”88 In 
the latter category, rolling easements present a novel legal concept that 
has been used in an effort to balance the public’s title to coastal land 
arising from the public trust with private landowners’ right to use and
develop their property. “[R]olling easements . . . are policies that allow 
development, but explicitly prevent property owners from holding back
the sea.”89 The term ‘rolling easement’ has its origins in the common law 
80.  16 U.S.C. § 1451 (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 114-327). 
81. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 66600-66694 (West, WestlawNext through (2016 Reg.
Sess. laws, Ch. 8 of 2015-2016 2nd Ex.Sess.); CAL. CODE REG. TIT. 14, §§ 10110-11990
(West, WestlawNext through 2/24/17 Register 2017, No. 8). 
82. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 29000-29612 (West, WestlawNext through 2016 Reg.
Sess. laws, Ch. 8 of 2015-2016 2nd Ex.Sess.).
83. What We Do, CAL. COASTAL COMMISSION, http://www.coastal.ca.gov/whoweare.
html [https://perma.cc/2847-FFJ7] (last visited Feb. 12, 2017). 
84. Id.
85.  U.S. Const. amend. V. 
86.  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
87. Peter Byrne, Rising Seas and Common Law Baselines, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 625, 
628 (2010).
88. James G. Titus, Does the U.S. Government Realize that the Sea is Rising?, 30
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 717, 733 (2000). 
89. Id. at 735. 
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of Texas, was codified in the Texas Open Beaches Act and is explained 
by James G. Titus as a “public trust that moves with rising sea levels.”90 
In a broad sense, these easements require human activities to yield to naturally 
migrating shorelines.91 
Rolling easements can be a workable solution because they accommodate
many of the tests of takings jurisprudence, including that they can be 
incorporated into reasonable investment-backed expectations and are
foreseeable. Rolling easements may also avoid invalidation under the 
takings analysis of Lucas, as they are based on common law ‘background 
principles’ of property law such as the public trust.92 Viewed in this way,
the ‘Lucas rule’ requires the use of each state’s common law of property
rights as the baseline from which to determine whether a taking of property 
has occurred. As a result, what would be a taking in one state would not 
be a taking in another, making it more difficult to establish legal justifications 
for the adoption of rolling easements on a national level. 
Some take issue with the preferential treatment given to the common 
law over legislative action93 and disagree with the approach taken in 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, wherein the Court used common
law property rights as “background principles” that provided a crucial
measure of the constitutional authority of legislatures.94 The disagreement 
centers on whether legislative changes and statutory enactments should be 
vetted against—and held subservient to—the common law, with one 
advocate of this perspective arguing instead that the question should be 
only “whether contemporary legislation is fair to all interested parties.”95 
Although this is an interesting perspective on the appropriate weighing of 
the legal underpinnings of rolling easements, a review of the options for
implementing rolling easements makes clear that when both common law
and statute are used in tandem, they present the strongest case for a valid
exercise of rolling easement power by states attempting to mitigate the
impacts of sea level rise on coastal public lands. 
There are several different ways in which the concept of rolling easements
may be implemented. Titus’ list includes (1) prohibiting structures that
armor against migrating shores, (2) purchasing a property right to take
90.  Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 19, at 61. 
91. Titus, supra note 88, at 737. 
92.  Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 19, at 61. 





















        








       
possession of privately owned land whenever the sea rises by a particular
amount, (3) including language in a deed that the boundary between public-
and privately-owned lands would migrate inland, or (4) passing a statute 
or ballot initiative clarifying existing property law by stating that all coastal 
land is subject to rolling easements.96 These tactics and others all stem
from three fundamentally different approaches California could take to establish
a legal claim to a rolling easement over a particular parcel: through statute, 
purchase or donation, or permitting. 
IV. ROLLING EASEMENTS IN CALIFORNIA
It is likely that rolling easements could withstand takings scrutiny if 
enacted in California. The Lucas rule relies heavily on state common law,
meaning what would be deemed a taking in one state could be legitimate 
in another. This makes it helpful to analyze the question both through (1)
the different legal bases for establishing rolling easements, and (2) the use 
of fact-specific hypotheticals.
A. Rolling Easements Through Statute 
Texas’ experience in this area serves as a case study in the use of statute 
to establish a rolling easement. The state of Texas adopted a referendum 
to amend the state’s constitution to “enshrine the public right of access to
the dry sand beach.”97 This constitutional amendment followed in the 
state’s tradition that started in statute with the Texas Open Beach Act (TOBA),
which states:
[I]f the public has acquired a right of use or easement to or over an area by
prescription, dedication, or has retained a right by virtue of continuous right in
the public, the public shall have the free and unrestricted right of ingress and
egress to the larger area extending from the line of mean low tide to the line of
vegetation bordering on the Gulf of Mexico.98 
Although the enactment of a statutory claim of the public’s right of access
provides a clear standard, announcing an inviolable right to use privately-
owned land threatens a potentially unconstitutional taking of that land 
without compensation. Titus argues that the statutory option would not be 
an unconstitutional taking because both the Public Trust Doctrine and the 
96. Titus, supra note 88, at 737–38. 
97. Byrne, supra note 87, at 630. 
98. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 61.011 (West, WestlawNext through 2015 Regular
Session of the 84th Legislature). 
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Doctrine of Erosion99 have long held that the beach zone is public property 
and that it migrates as the shore erodes.100 
If the California Legislature enacted a statute similar to the Texas Open 
Beaches Act, it is possible that ‘rolling easements’ could withstand legal 
scrutiny under the state’s background principles of property law, as outlined 
in Lucas. Using either the legislative or ballot initiative process (as was 
used in Texas), California could enact a statute as drafted below: 
It is the express public policy of the state of California that the public shall have
the free and unrestricted right of ingress and egress to the larger area extending
from the line of mean low tide/publicly-owned tidelands to the line of mean high
tide bordering on the Pacific Ocean, including shifts in the vegetation line resulting
from avulsive events or other natural forces. The ecological preservation of, and
assurance of continued public access to, these areas are a part of the state’s obligations
under the public trust, and are to be maintained and preserved in accordance with 
that legal obligation.
In furtherance of this express public policy, the creation, erection or construction
of any obstruction, barrier or restraint that interferes with this public easement is
deemed unlawful.
“In the standard takings analysis the state must first demonstrate that 
the taking was for a valid public purpose.”101 California common law
recognizes the public’s title to coastal beach lands through the public trust,
codified in the state’s Coastal Act as noted above. As Professor Sax notes, 
the situation of inundation of previously dry land and the impact on title 
is properly viewed not as whether or not the individual loses title to nature 
in a vacuum, but rather as the intersection of two valid claims of title to 
the land, the individual’s and the state’s.102 Thus the question should not
only be assessed from the private landowner’s perspective as to whether
their property right has or has not been taken, but also from the perspective 
of the state’s property right in the public trust lands and its obligation to
99. E. Britt Bailey, From Sea to Rising Sea: How Climate Change Challenges Coastal 
Land Use Laws 289, 292 n.29 (2010) (“Erosion and accretion are opposing terms describing
the often imperceptible decreasing or broadening of sands along a shoreline . . . Avulsion 
refers to a sudden and perceptible loss of land abutting water generally caused by a storm-
like surge along the shoreline.”) (citing JOSEPH J. KALO ET AL., COASTAL & OCEAN LAW
42 (2nd ed. 2002)). 
100. Titus, supra note 88, at 739. 
101. Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 19, at 76. 
102. See Joseph L. Sax, Some Unorthodox Thoughts About Rising Sea Levels, Beach 
Erosion, and Property Rights, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 641 (2010). 
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preserve and maintain them for posterity.103 In that case, the private owner’s
assertion of their rights via the exclusion of the public and the lack of
preservation of the beach could be seen as a taking of the public’s property
rights. This view of California’s common law of the public trust supports 
the ability to enact statutes effecting rolling easements in the state. 
Because California has a strong public trust doctrine, and significant
statutory authority over coastline management and development, a rolling 
easement statute may be strongest if its language explicitly states that it is 
declaratory of existing law. The implication is that it would not create a 
new claim of right but simply codify an existing one—a background 
principle—which could prove critical in future takings claims that are assessed
under the Lucas rule. 
There may be other important legal grounds for public easements in the
context of California. The California Coastal Act’s Section 30007.5 states
that “conflicts be resolved in a manner which on balance is the most protective 
of significant coastal resources.”104 This section could be interpreted as a 
codification of the state’s public trust doctrine and the state’s obligation to
protect public resources against threats including “erosion by private 
parties.”105 
Unfortunately, the phrase “erosion by private parties” is not defined, raising 
a number of compelling statutory interpretation questions in the context 
of climate change. This “erosion” could be interpreted as a reference to
the public trust-based property right, the public’s “title” so to speak, to the 
beach. Alternatively, it could refer to the erosion of the public trust lands
themselves, to actual physical erosion that is caused by “private parties,”
or humans. Even if the latter interpretation is correct, it is not clear whether it
includes beach movement resulting from sea-level rise and/or more frequent 
or severe storm events that are the direct and traceable result of global
warming. This interpretation begs the question of whether anthropogenic 
climate change leading to coastline migration through erosion could qualify 
as “erosion by private parties” for purposes of the protective provisions in 
the statute. Although it doesn’t appear that these questions have been litigated 
yet, establishing these connections could greatly solidify the legal basis for 
the recognition of rolling easements along California’s coastline. 
Looking beyond the legal assessment of a possible rolling easement
statute, there would be major political impediments to this effort. Any
attempt to enact a rolling easement statute in California—either through 
103. Id.
 104. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30007.5 (West, WestlawNext through 2016 Reg. Sess. 
laws, ch. 8 of 2015-2016 2nd Ex.Sess.). 
105. Meg Caldwell & Craig Holt Segall, No Day at the Beach: Sea Level Rise, Ecosystem 
Loss, and Public Access Along the California Coast, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 533, 561–62. 
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the legislative process or through a ballot initiative—would face intense 
opposition from existing coastal landowners with significant financial 
resources at their disposal. 
B. Rolling Easements Through Purchase or Landowner Donation 
Unlike the prior option of affirming the existence of a rolling easement 
right through statutory declaration and without compensation, the method
of paying the landowner (or accepting the landowner’s donation of the 
easement) provides constitutional safeguards as long as the compensation 
paid is ‘just’ or sufficient.106 Although this option is a useful one, it is also
extremely expensive given the high value of coastal property in California,
and is not a practical option beyond areas of significant ecological significance.
C. Rolling Easements Through Permitting 
Many entities have jurisdiction over land use along the state’s beaches 
and must issue permits to those looking to build within or near those
protected areas. Coastal land use is regulated by the California Coastal
Commission107 and public trust lands including tidelands, submerged lands
and the beds of navigable rivers, streams, lakes, bays, estuaries, inlets, and
straits are overseen by the state California State Lands Commission.108 
These entities oversee coastal development through the issuance of permits 
and leases, respectively.109 The Coastal Commission recently released its
Sea Level Rise Policy Guidance, which recommends the use of rolling 
easements in its section on Adaptation Strategies, and clarifies that the 
approaches included under that heading are broader than those featuring 
recorded leases.110 Thus a rolling easement could be implemented by the
Coastal Commission or other entity through a permit, lease or other regulatory 
device that isn’t an ‘easement’ per se. 
106. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
 107. Our Mission, CAL. COASTAL COMMISSION, https://www.coastal.ca.gov/whowe 
are.html [https://perma.cc/2GHT-UPGS] (last visited Mar. 5, 2017). 
108. About the State Lands Commission, CAL. STATE LANDS COMMISSION, http://www.
slc.ca.gov/About/Overview.html [https://perma.cc/WPT5-SX5X] (last visited Mar. 5, 2017).
109. Id.
 110. California Coastal Comm., California Coastal Commission Sea Level Rise Policy
Guidance: Interpretive Guidelines for Addressing Sea Level Rise in Local Coastal Programs
and Coastal Development Permits, CAL. COASTAL COMMISSION 134, https://documents.
coastal.ca.gov/assets/slr/guidance/August2015/0_Full_Adopted_Sea_Level_Rise_Policy
_Guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4GN-L7DR] (last visited Mar. 5, 2017). 
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As an example of a different approach that yields a rolling easement-
type effect, the Guidance includes an explanation of Section 30253 of the 
Coastal Act as supporting the Commission’s use of setback requirements 
for coastal developments.111 Although the requirement ensures continued
access to beach land along the shore by limiting development’s encroachment
on the water line, footnote 49 takes care to clarify the nature of the approach: 
This legal instrument is not an easement but it does provide for ‘planned retreat’
into the future as a site erodes. Once a development is removed, a site may have
potential for new development if it is once again set back and restricted against
future shoreline protection device construction.112 
The ability to include a rolling easement in a coastal development permit
is questionable though, given that precedent includes the seminal California
Nollan case, wherein the Supreme Court denied the Coastal Commission’s
effort to require a beach access easement as a condition of issuing a
development permit.113 The Nollan Court didn’t bar the use of easement
requirements as permit conditions as a general rule, but it did deny them 
if they weren’t being required to address the same issue that would provide
the Commission with justification to otherwise deny the permit outright.114 
In Nollan the Commission had required an access easement based on the
claim that the Nollans’ construction blocked the public’s view of the ocean. 
Had the Commission instead argued that the construction sought to be 
permitted would have limited beach access, the easement requirement
would likely have passed and not been a taking. As a result, land use 
permitting presents a pathway for implementation of rolling easements,
but care must be taken to ensure that the permitting process justification
meets the requirements outlined by the Court in Nollan. 
The date that the permit was issued could also impact the takings
analysis, according to the Penn Central factors. Court precedent holds that 
the permit holder may not be able to argue a right to develop land or obtain
either a permit or waiver based on permitting requirements imposed after
the developer has acted in reliance on their individual/private property 
rights.115 In Avco, the California Supreme Court established rules limiting 
the ‘vested rights doctrine’ governing development and permits.116 The
Court held that a developer did not have a right to finish his or her
development that could be based on either the common law or pursuant to 
111. Id. at 164–65. 
112. Id. at 165. 
113. 
114. 
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987). 
Id. at 837. 
115. Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc. v. S. Coast Reg’l Comm’n., 553 P.2d 546, 548
(Cal. 1976).
116. Id. at 550–57. 
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the Coastal Zone Conservation Act, a state law enacted after the developer
had secured local approvals and completed significant work on the project.117 
As a result, properties acquired since that decision should have, under 
Penn Central, distinct investment-backed expectations that there is no 
‘vested right’ to develop in these sensitive coastal areas, unless a building 
permit has been issued (in which case the right is vested). The state can
thus utilize its agents’ permitting authority to implement rolling easements
along the coast by limiting development and private property uses that inhibit 
its claim to those lands and avoid related takings claims. 
D. Rolling Easements in California Under Specific Conditions 
Rolling easements’ validity in California may vary depending on the 
circumstances of a given case. Although the easements could be implemented 
using a variety of legal vehicles as previously described, the factual conditions
surrounding the coastline’s migration in a given situation could also impact
the legal validity of the easement. The two types of climate change-induced
coastline migration—sea level rise and storm event-induced erosion— 
vary in temporal terms that could significantly impact courts’ takings analysis. 
Assuming that the first Penn Central factor, character of government 
action, is statutory or regulatory (as in the case of enactment of the draft statute)
and not a direct physical taking, the timing of the beach’s movement could 
significantly impact a court’s consideration of the remaining two Penn 
Central factors. 
1. Gradual Inundation Through Sea-Level Rise 
Could a rolling easement apply in California to coastal private lands
inundated over time by climate change-induced sea level rise? Assessing
the takings implications of this hypothetical would require use of the Penn
Central analysis because the denial of armoring or rebuilding permits by
the state (as they could violate the state’s rolling easement) would not 
deprive the property of all economic value since it could conceivably be
resided in or used in some fashion up until it was completely inundated. 
In the case of sea level rise, the second Penn Central factor—the economic 
impact of regulation or statute—may weigh against a finding of takings 
because it could be argued as distant and attenuated, since the coastal migration 
is largely gradual.  The third factor—the property owner’s reasonable
 117. Id. at 801–02. 
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investment-backed expectations—could also yield support for the rolling 
easement in the sea-level rise context, due to the foreseeability of the change. 
The strength of the determination of ‘predictability’ could vary depending 
on when property was purchased.118 If the state can show that the property 
owner’s expectations at the time of purchase should have included 
consideration of sea level rise due to global warming, then a takings claim 
could be avoided.119 However, this outcome is not assured, as in recent 
years the Supreme Court has held that notice of a regulation, and thus its 
predictability, does not preclude a takings claim.120 
Showing predictability—or foreseeability—is a challenge that could be
met in several ways. Existence of a state statute—like the California Coastal 
Act121—that articulates not only the state’s right to a rolling easement but 
also the inevitability of climate change-induced global warming and its 
impact on coastlines through gradual sea level rise would be helpful. Such 
statutory enactments would put buyers on notice of this condition and help
to avoid takings claims when the state later moved to preserve migrating 
beach lands pursuant to its rolling easement. For example, statutory notice
was used in the Texas Open Beach Act to show property owners that their 
title is subject to loss as a result of natural events.122 
Peloso and Caldwell argue that to find that the investment-backed 
expectations of a property owner are unreasonable, it must be shown that 
they had constructive notice of the temporal limitations on the land’s title 
and also that they cannot recover the value of the investment within that
timeframe.123 The first part of this test can generally be shown through the
common law doctrines governing littoral land boundaries (accretion, avulsion 
and the public trust), dictating that landowners must know that the water 
boundary of their parcel may change. The second part of the test is more
difficult, as it requires a showing “that climate change and its impacts are
sufficiently established in the public consciousness such that the property
owner should have been aware of the potential that his property would be 
inundated.”124 
Recent developments in California further speak to the potential utility 
of rolling easements in the context of sea level rise: “Recently, the State
Lands Commission has begun adding language to its title settlements and 
118. Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 19, at 81. 
119. Id. at 70. 
120. Mark W. Cordes, The Effect of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island on Takings and
Environmental Land Use Regulation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 337, 338 (2003). 
121. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West, WestlawNext through 2016 
Reg.Sess. laws, Ch. 8 of 2015-2016 2nd Ex.Sess.). 
122. Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 19, at 100. 
123. Id. at 81. 
124. Id.
246



















   
        
  
     
  
 
[VOL. 8:  225, 2016–17] DO Mess With Texas…? 
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
boundary line agreements to indicate that lands that are currently not part
of the public trust, but may be inundated by sea level rise in the future, 
will be subject to a public trust easement.”125 The fact that state agencies
with jurisdiction over coastal development and permitting in California have
begun to implement rolling easement-type mechanisms suggests that 
these legal instruments could withstand takings challenges. 
2. Sudden Inundation Through Severe Storm Events 
The court in Severance v. Patterson bifurcated the state of Texas’ previous
recognition of a rolling easement on Gulf Coast beaches by stating that 
avulsive changes to the coastal profile did not effect a migration of title.126 
Although the holding in that case does not apply to California, it reveals 
some of the legal issues involved in determining the linkage between an
individual’s property rights in coastal land and the particular cause of the 
movement of the beach. 
Severance’s holding that the particular landowner in the case had not
lost his or her title turned in one respect on the statute itself and the Texas 
OBA’s provision that the public property right must have been based on 
prescription or dedication, or the retention of a “continuous right of the 
public.”127 The court held that there was a significant break in time regarding 
the validity of the public’s right to access the beach because the original
land grants in the area contained no mention of public right of access. As
a result, the right did not count as “continuous” under the OBA statute, 
and the rolling easement did not exist. 
If California were to enact a rolling easement statute, rolling easements 
resulting from sudden coastline migration due to storm events could be 
viewed by courts as a total loss of economic value of the land by the 
landowner, yielding a ‘per se’ taking under Lucas.128 Alternatively, if the
court views use of the land up until the occurrence of such a storm as a 
showing that not all economic value has been lost, the easement would be 
assessed through the Penn Central factors to determine if it effected an
 125. Molly Loughney Melius & Margaret R. Caldwell, 2015 California Coastal Armoring 
Report: Managing Coastal Armoring and Climate Change Adaptation in the 21st Century, 
2015 STAN. L. SCHOOL ENVTL. & NAT. RESOURCES L. & POL. PROGRAM, 1, 18. 
126. Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 732 (Tex. 2012). 
127. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 61.011(a) (West, WestlawNext through 2015 Regular
Session of the 84th Legislature).
128. See Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
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unconstitutional taking. The economic impact of the statute, though not
complete, would still be far more significant than the economic impact of 
the loss of property to the easement because of gradual sea level rise.
Finally, the reasonable investment-backed expectations are problematic
in this hypothetical as it would be nearly impossible for a landowner to 
recover any investment in property that was covered by the sea. 
Grounding a statutory easement in the public trust doctrine—a ‘background 
principle’ of California property law—could validate the statute and avoid 
a takings finding. Absent invocation of this ‘per se’ exemption from Lucas, 
it seems unlikely that a rolling easement statute in California would be
effective in the context of severe storm events and resulting avulsive coastline 
changes.129 
V. CONCLUSION
Although their enactment would be complicated by political realities, 
rolling easements remain a novel and viable policy option to address the 
erosion of public beach access in California due to climate change. Since
only avulsive changes to beach property were at issue in Severance, the 
primary precedential holding on the rolling easement issue is silent on the 
legal status of the easements’ application to coastal migration resulting from 
gradual boundary movement, including through sea-level rise driven by 
global warming, and is not binding on California courts. Given the frequency 
of stories of coastline erosion within the state, it is easy to see a test case 
emerging in the very near future. 
Despite the lack of clarity about the best solution to coastline migration,
the inevitability of climate change will require approaches that may include 
the adaptation of longstanding tenets of property law and public policy. 
Until incidents actually occur and California courts respond, we are left
to examine history and its rulings to try to divine answers. As the above 
analysis illustrates, a carefully drafted statutory conferral of public rolling 
easements of coastal property in California may withstand judicial scrutiny, 
but likely only in the context of beach migration due to sea level rise, not
storm events. When—not if—the latter situation occurs, California will
face a monumental public policy question. We can either sidestep the 
issue, as Texas did, or we can elect to definitively answer the larger public 
policy question of who really does—and who should—own the beach in
California. 
129. See id.
248
